“Pay-per-last-$N$-shares” (PPLNS) is one of the most common payout strategies
used by mining pools in Proof-of-Work (PoW) cryptocurrencies. As with any
payment scheme, it is imperative to study issues of incentive compatibility of
miners within the pool. For PPLNS this question has only been partially
answered; we know that reasonably-sized miners within a PPLNS pool prefer
following the pool protocol over employing specific deviations. In this paper,
we present a novel modification to PPLNS where we randomise the protocol in a
natural way. We call our protocol “Randomised pay-per-last-$N$-shares”
(RPPLNS), and note that the randomised structure of the protocol greatly
simplifies the study of its incentive compatibility. We show that RPPLNS
maintains the strengths of PPLNS (i.e., fairness, variance reduction, and
resistance to pool hopping), while also being robust against a richer class of
strategic mining than what has been shown for PPLNS.

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